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Abstract
Cryptographic hash functions are used to protect the authenticity of information. Some of the most popular and 
commonly used cryptographic hash algorithms are MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD. These hash algorithms are used in a 
wide variety of security applications e.g. securing node/message in traditional networks. However, the commonly 
used hash algorithms require huge computational overhead which is not affordable by applications in energy-starved 
network e.g. wireless sensor network (WSN). In these applications the major constraints are communication, 
computation and storage overheads; out of which communication and computation overheads consume high energy. 
Keeping this fact in mind, in this paper, a light-weight, one-way, cryptographic hash algorithm is developed with a 
target to produce a hash-digest with fixed and relatively small length for such an energy-starved wireless network. 
The primary focus is making the algorithm light-weight so that upon using it in application of network like WSN, 
the nodes can successfully run the algorithm with low energy. We claim the algorithm fulfils all the basic properties 
such as preimage resistance, collision resistance of a one-way unkeyed hash function. Finally the comparative 
usability of the hash algorithm in the said application domain is worked out and that shows the dominance of our 
scheme over two of the state-of-the-art hashing schemes.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Hash algorithms play an important role in modern cryptography. They are widely used in a variety of security
applications such as node authentication[1, 2], message authentication[3], password protection[4], digital signature[5]
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etc. The hash function uses a string of arbitrary length as its input and creates a fixed-length string as output. The 
fixed-length hash value is often called message digest. The most widely used hash functions are one-way functions 
for which finding an input which hashes to a pre-specified hash-value is very difficult. Hash functions may be split 
into two classes[16]: unkeyed hash functions, whose specification dictates a single input parameter (a message); and 
keyed hash functions, whose specification dictates two distinct inputs, a message and a secret key. Two commonly 
used functions are MD5 and SHA-1. Both SHA-1 and MD5 are derived from MD4 which has been known[6] for its 
weaknesses. MD5 which uses a hash algorithm with 128-bit output has been designed in 1991 and in 2005 it was 
shown[7] how quickly random collisions for MD5 can be constructed. Also it is not suitable for applications that rely
on the properties like SSL certificates or digital signatures. In [8] authors have shown that how a pair of X.509 
certificates can be created that result in the same MD5 hash digest. Then cryptographers began recommending the 
use of other algorithms, such as SHA-1 which has since been found to be vulnerable[9] as well and most U.S. 
government applications now require the SHA-2 and SHA-3 family of hash functions[10, 11]. But most of these 
widely used hash functions are used in large conventional networks.
Unlike conventional network, in short-lived, energy-constrained network like WSNs, for many applications 
nodes are deployed[12] in outdoor environment without human monitoring and therefore, data authenticity and 
reliability becomes the main concern to deal with such kind of networks. Since WSN suffers from many constraints 
including low processing power, low battery life, small memory and wireless communication channel, it is not able 
to deal with traditional cryptographic algorithms. Due to these limitations, it becomes mandatory to devise 
lightweight security solutions for WSNs. Many works are reported so far towards hash-based security solutions and 
a few of these works[13, 14, 15] are briefed here. Here [13, 14] give solutions for WSNs whereas [15] is not typically meant 
for WSNs. However, to the best of our knowledge no attempt has been reported to make light weight hash algorithm 
customized for energy-starved network like WSN. 
In one such work[13], authors have presented a hash-based signature scheme which can be used to 
authenticate messages both for unicast and broadcast communication. They have claimed that both the signature 
generation and verification are faster than other existing schemes e.g. ECDSA (elliptic curve digital signature 
algorithm). In security analysis, they have shown that the signature scheme is preimage and second preimage 
resistant. However, the authors have not claimed about collision resistance, the other important property.
The authors of [14] have designed an efficient and robust scheme against node capture attack using hash 
chain in WSN. The basic idea of the scheme is applying a hash function on the initial preloaded keys in the nodes 
before their deployment. The hashed key is used as communication key. The one-way property of hash function 
reduces the exposure of data due to node capture attack. It also shows an improvement compared to other existing 
schemes in terms of key exposal probability and resilience against node capture attack.
In [15] authors have presented a cryptographic hash function Whirlwind which can be efficiently 
implemented in software. It can be considered as an improvement in design compared to SHA3 hash functions. It 
employs large S-boxes which allow efficient and flexible implementations on a wide variety of platforms. The hash 
function produces 512-bit digest by incorporating a compression function, computing initialization vector etc. The 
digest is presented by an 8x4 array of 16-bit elements each. Though the cryptanalysis of the hash function shows an 
improvement but while implemented in software the performance is not very fast compared to the other competing 
schemes. 
In this paper we aim to propose a light-weight one-way hash algorithm (LOCHA) which produces a hash-
digest with fixed and relatively small length. The LOCHA satisfies all the properties of a one-way unkeyed hash 
functions. Moreover the algorithm is light-weight in nature thereby makes it suitable for energy-starved WSN.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed hashing scheme followed by the 
implementing algorithm. Comparative performance of the scheme including the justification of our claim about 
maintenance of basic cryptographic hash properties is evaluated in Section 3. We conclude our work along with the 
future scopes in section 4.
2. LOCHA: The proposed hashing scheme
In this section we describe the proposed light-weight hashing scheme along with the algorithm for generating the 
same. The target application may be securing (e.g. node authentication) energy-starved networks like WSN. The 
hashing scheme described here creates a relatively short-length, fixed hash digest from an input message of arbitrary 
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length. We assume that the input message consists of only those characters which belong to the set of the 96 
printable ASCII characters (character code 32-127) only. The first 32 characters in the ASCII table are unprintable 
control codes used to control peripherals such as printers etc. and hence their exclusion is justified.
2.1. The Scheme
The input message is first preprocessed by converting it into binary representation of the respective ASCII codes of 
the constituent characters and employing unambiguous padding in the least significant position of the message to 
make it divisible by 512. Even if the length of the processed message is already a multiple of 512, an additional 512 
0’s are added to enhance the robustness of the algorithm. Now the preprocessed message is split 3 times in a nested 
manner where the first level nested split results in block size of 512-bit each. The second level and third level nested 
split result in block size of 64-bit and 8-bit respectively. 
Subsequent to the above splits, 3 steps of transformations are employed on the input message. Firstly
blocks of 512-bit are taken. Each of these 512-bit blocks is divided into 8, 64-bit blocks. Now, every 64-bit block is 
further subdivided into 8 numbers of 8-bit blocks. Substitution of each of these 8-bit inner most split blocks takes 
place at first by a prime number selected from a substitution table S-Table1. This table consists of 97 prime numbers
(96 for the printable ASCII characters and 1 for padding; small prime numbers are chosen to reduce overheads). 
Now for every 64-bit block a number is computed using the aforementioned 8 substituted values and that creates the 
output of the first level transformation. 
Once the first transformation is over, the second transformation takes place using another substitution table 
S-Table2 which consists of 67 prime numbers. Here, 67 numbers are chosen randomly to ensure uniformity in 
transformation and to reduce storage overhead. These values of S-Table2 are computed by the formula 
log(sin(index+128)), where index= 0,…,66. The third step transformation is done using the result of the first and 
second step transformations. The decimal result of the third step received from each 64-bit block, is then converted 
to the equivalent 3-digit hexadecimal number. 
Now the 3-level swapping is applied to the 24-digit hexadecimal number of each 512-bit block. Due to lack 
of space the details of all the 3-level swapping are excluded here.
After all the swap functions are completed, we receive the final hash digest of 96 bits for each 512-bit 
message. All such hash digests for each of the 512-bit blocks are then added modular arithmetically to get the final 
hash digest for the complete message.
The two substitution tables viz. S-Table1 and S-Table2 are attached in the Appendix section. To keep the tables 
concise all the values of the tables are not shown.
2.2. Algorithm
Input: A message (X) of arbitrary length (consist of 96 printable ASCII characters only)
Output: A hash digest (H) of 96 bits
Initialize the followings-
i) H to 0 // final hash digest
ii) 1 _step conversion to 1 // variable related to the 1st step conversion of the input
iii) 2 _ 3step conversionpart to 7 // variable related to the 2
nd step conversion of the input
iv) ( 1)1hexdigiti j ( 1)0hexdigiti j to 0 when j=0 // hexadecimal digits
Begin
1. Convert each of the character of X into the 8-bit binary // X= , , ...,0 1 7X X X
2. Apply unambiguous padding
3. Obtain X' // after appending 0’s in the LSB of  X to make it divisible by 512
4. Split X' // splitting in t number of 512-bit blocks
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5. for(i=0; i<t; i++) //  for t number of 512-bis block subblocki
6. for(j=0; j<=7; j++) // for 8 number of  64-bit block subblockij
7.               Hi =  //variable storing the digest for i
th512-bit block is initialized as empty
8. for(k=0; k<=7; k++) // for 8 number of 8-bit block subblockijk
9.                Obtain subblockijk // result of Split X'
10.                  if  subblockijk contains at least one 1
11. p
k
=decimal( subblockijk ) –  31 // pk
{2, 3, ..., 97}
12.                            subblockijk =S-Table1[ pk
]
13.                 else // when subblockijk contains all 0’s
14.                             subblockijk =S-Table1[1] // pk
=1
15.                     end if
16.                    1 _step conversion =S-Table1( p
k
) x 1 _step conversion
17.                  if( 161 _ 2 1step conversion !  )
18.                        1 _step conversion = 161 _ %2step conversion
19.          end if
20.         end for // end of 8, 8-bit blocks
21.              Compute 2 _ 1step conversionpart = 1 _step conversion % 67
22.           if ( subblockijk [1][7]==0) // subblockijk [1][7] denotes 8
th bit of 2nd subblock 1subblockij
23.                Compute 2 _ 2step conversionpart = 2 _ 1step conversionpart
24.           else
25.              Compute 2 _ 2step conversionpart = 67 - 2 _ 1step conversionpart
26.           end if
27.           Compute 2 _ 3step conversionpart = [ 2 _ 3step conversionpart + ( 2 _ 1step conversionpart +            
            1 _step conversion ) %256]
28.           Generate 2 _after step conversion = (1 _step conversion % 2 _ 3step conversionpart ) +   
           1 _step conversion + S-Table2 [ 2 _ 2step conversionpart ]
29. Compute 3 _after step conversion = ( 2 _after step conversion % 255) + 
2
p + decimal    
equivalent ( ( 1)1hexdigiti j ( 1)0hexdigiti j ) + 0
p % 127 //
0
p ,
2
p are p
k
values when     
k=0, k=2 respectively
30.           Convert 3 _after step conversion to hexnumberij // hexnumberij = 0 1 2hexdigit hexdigit hexdigitij ij ij
31.            Apply intra-hexnumber hexdigit swapping on each hexnumber // 1st level swapping on 
hexdigits   of each 64-bit block
32.          Compute Hi = concat( Hi , hexnumberij )
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33.            Apply inter-hexnumber hexdigit swapping on hexdigits of j 64-bit blocks  // 2nd level
swapping
34.       end for // end of 8,64-bit blocks
35.   Compute Hi = ...0 1 6 7hexnumber hexnumber hexnumber hexnumberi i i i
36.    Apply inter-hexnumber swapping  on Hi // 3rd level swapping
37.             Compute final hash digest, H=H+ Hi // ignoring the carry bits
38. end for // end of t, 512-bit blocks
End
3.  Performance Analysis
In this section primarily we focus on the strength of the proposed hash algorithm, LOCHA. Subsequently we 
provide comparative performance through qualitative analysis. 
3.1. Strength of LOCHA
We evaluate the strength of the algorithm by showing the extent of maintaining the following basic cryptographic 
properties[16] of a one-way hash function. Breaking of the proposed hashing scheme requires breaking these 
cryptographic properties.
i. Preimage Resistance - For a given output (hash digest) H corresponding to a unknown input, it is 
computationally infeasible to find a input (message) m such that h(m) =H where h(m) is the hash digest of 
m. It represents the one-way property of a hash function.
ii. Collision Resistance - It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct input (messages) m1, m2
which hash to the same output, such that h(m1) = h(m2).
iii. Second Preimage Resistance - given an input m1, it is computationally infeasible to find any second input 
m2 which has the same output i.e., h(m1) = h(m2). 
We claim that the hash algorithm LOCHA maintains all the above basic properties. We also provide the justifications 
of our claims of maintaining preimage resistance, collision resistance and second preimage resistance. Due to space 
limitation the complete justification of Collision Resistance cannot be provided.
Preimage Resistance: 
As demonstrated in the algorithm LOCHA, the final hash digest is the sum of t number of 24-digit hexadecimal 
numbers where the value of t depends on the size of the input. Let H be the final hash digest. So 
1
0
t
H Hi
i

¦ 
 
(modular arithmetic) where Hi is the 24-digit (hexadecimal) hash digest from the (i+1)
th 512-bit block, so there are 
1
1
H t
Ct
 
 possible ways to calculate Hi . For the simplest case, let us consider that the input size is only 512 bits 
i.e. t =1. Therefore, number of solutions for the above becomes 1. We also consider the mote class attacker which 
tries to break the hash digest. In the average case for the attacker, upon capturing the digest H, while it attempts to 
find a message m such that h(m) = H(given), all the possible numbers of tasks the attacker has to perform are as 
follows.
i. In the algorithm, 3-level swapping (steps 31, 33, 36) requires 24 x 4, 4 and 28 x 8 x 2 possible number of 
operations respectively.
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ii. For the calculation of the variable 3 _after step conversion in step 29 the values of p0, p2 which directly 
influence the input m have to be guessed. Whatever the values chosen for them, it should satisfy the loop 
iterations k=0 and 2(step 8). Possible values of
0
p , 
2
p and 2 _after step conversion in this step are 97, 127 
and 255 respectively. So computation of 3 _after step conversion requires 97 x 128 x 255 x 162 operations, 
where 162 is for the hex digits.
iii. In step 28 for the computation of 2 _after step conversion the number of operations required are as follows, 
67 x 2 possible ways of selecting values from S-Table2, for 2 _ 3step conversionpart there are 256x4 
(average case) and for selecting the value of 1 _step conversion , 215 (reducing range considering that some 
numbers can never be chosen) possible number of operations are required (steps 17 and 18).   
iv. For the steps 8-20 total possible operations are 8 x 97 x 28
Summing up the total number of possible operations from all the above we get,
24 x 4 x 4 x 28 x 8 x 2 x 97 x 127 x 255 x 162 x 67 x 2 x 256 x 4 x 215 x 8 x 97 x 28 
§ 296   [under-estimating 127, 97 and 67 as 26   and 255 as 27]
Hence the only method to find a valid message satisfying the aforementioned conditions is using brute force method 
and by definition, an ideal hash function is such that the fastest way to compute a preimage is through a brute force 
attack. Hence the algorithm is preimage resistant. For an n-bit hash digest, the attacker has to perform operations[17]
of the order of 2n . Hence, for LOCHA, it is of the order of 296operations. Time to perform 296 operations for Mica2 
mote using ATMega 128 processor[18] clocked at 7.37MHz is 143.4u years.
Collision Resistance:
In LOCHA, to find out two different messages m1 and m2 with hash digests h1 and h2 respectively such that h1=h2, 
the followings need to be true             
i) ( 1)hexnumber mij = ( 2)hexnumber mij   ׊ i, j where i א {0,1,…,t-1}  and  j א {0,1,…7} and            
ii) subblock ( 1)mij  subblock ( 2)mij ׌ i, j where i א {0,1,…,t-1}  and  j א {0,1,…7}          
For the aforementioned conditions to be true at least one of the following conditions need to be satisfied:
a) 1step_conversionij (m1) = 1step_conversionij (m2)  and sub_blockij (m1)  sub_blockij (m2)
b) after2step_conversionij (m1) = after2step_conversionij (m2) and sub_blockij (m1)  sub_blockij (m2)
c) after3step_conversionij (m1) = after3step_conversionij (m2) and sub_blockij (m1)  sub_blockij (m2)
d) The values Hi  (m1) and Hi  (m2) are permutations of each other before  swapping occurs and the respective 
swap logic should ensure that after steps 31-36, Hi (m1)= Hi (m2) and  sub_blockij (m1)  sub_blockij (m2)
Now, it can be proved that in our proposed algorithm, brute force method is the only possible way to satisfy at least 
one of the above conditions. Hence our algorithm is collision resistant and the difficulty of coming up with two 
messages having the same message digest is the order of 248 operations[17] by the brute force method and the time to 
perform 248 operations for Mica2 mote using ATMega 128 processor[18] clocked at 7.37MHz is 1.21 years.
Second Preimage Resistance:
Second preimage resistance is considered as an easier or weaker version of collision resistance[16]. So, a collision 
resistant function is also a second preimage resistant. It is conjectured that the difficulty of coming up with a 
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message having the same digest as a given message is of the order 296 operations which takes the same time as 
preimage resistance in Mica2 mote.
Further, referring the algorithm, for each iteration, the values of 2 _ 3step conversionpart and 1 _step conversion depend 
on the respective values computed in the immediately preceding iteration (except for the very first iteration).This 
enforces the avalanche effect.
3.2. Performance Analysis
In this section our hash algorithm is evaluated (Table 1) in terms of communication, computation and storage 
overheads. The performance is also compared with two commonly used hash algorithms viz. MD5 and SHA-1.
Table 1. Comparative Performance.
Scheme Communication 
Overhead (Hash Digest 
in bits)
Computation 
Overhead (clock 
cycles)
                                   Storage Overhead
RAM/ROM Number of Registers
MD5 128 36360
32 RAM of 32-bit block 
data and ROM of 2368 
bits/296 byte
12 registers of 32 bits
SHA-1 160 84272 32 RAM of 32-bit block 
data 12 Registers of 32 bits
LOCHA 96 2952 1 ROM of 804 bits and 1 
ROM of 970 bits
4 registers of 16 bits, 18 registers 
of 8 bits
As per Mica2 specification, energy consumption[19] for transmitting one byte of data for ATMega 128 processor[18]
is 16.25ȝJ and energy required per clock cycle[20] is 3.2nJ or 0.0032PJ. For the given specification, the energy 
requirements for all the competing schemes are computed below:
Communication overhead:
MD5 -- 16.25x128 (bit) = 16.25x16 (byte) = 260 PJ
SHA1-- 16.25x160 (bit) = 16.25x20 (byte) = 325 PJ
LOCHA -- 16.25x96 (bit) = 16.25x12 (byte) = 195 PJ
Computation overhead:
MD5 -- 0.0032 x 36360 = 116.352PJ 
SHA1-- 0.0032 x 84272 = 269.6704PJ 
LOCHA -- 0.0032 x 2952 = 9.4464PJ
So, in terms of communication, computation and storage overhead our proposed hash algorithm outperforms the 
other popular schemes. Moreover for energy-starved network like WSN this scheme has been proved to be much 
more suitable as well than the other strong hash algorithms such as MD5, SHA1.
4. Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper we propose a lightweight, one-way hash algorithm which produces a hash digest with fixed and 
relatively small length and applicable for securing energy-starved wireless network e.g. WSN. The algorithm is 
made lightweight by using low overhead operations such as MOD, SWAP etc. as much as possible. We claim that 
our scheme fulfils all the basic properties such as preimage resistance, collision resistance and second preimage 
resistance of a one-way unkeyed hash function. Our claims of maintaining preimage resistance and second preimage 
resistance are justified. We also show that the proposed algorithm is light-weight in terms of communication, 
computation and storage overhead. The comparative performance also show our scheme’s energy efficiency 
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compared to MD5 and SHA-1.
As a future extension, attempt will be made to use the generated hash digest in node/message authentication in 
WSN. Finally the entire scheme would be simulated using a real-time simulator e.g. Contiki to crosscheck our claim 
made in performance analysis.
Appendix
S-Table 1
[1-20] 521 997 983 733 … 53 59 61 67 71
[21-40] 73 79 83 89 … 151 157 163 167 173
… … …
[61-80] 809 293 307 311 … 383 389 397 401 409
[81-97] 863 421 431 433 … 503 509
S-Table 2
[1-10] 2895 2887 2879 2871 … 2846 2837 2828 2818
[11-20] 2809 2799 2788 2778 … 2746 2734 2723 2711
… … …
[51-60] 3127 2323 2255 2240 … 2195 2180 2164 2149
[61-67] 2134 2120 2105 2090 … 2045
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